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 Robert  Leckey , ed. 
 Aft er Legal Equality: Family, Sex, Kinship .  London :  Routledge ,  2015 ,  224 pp. 
 In his thoughtful introduction to  Aft er Legal Equality, McGill law professor Robert 
Leckey makes a strong case for the breadth and signifi cance of the book’s titular theme. 
“Research ‘aft er legal equality,’” he writes, should explore “at least fi ve phenomena”: 
1) the “dismantlement” of victories won “in the name of legal equality”; 2) other 
types of “backlash”; 3) formal equality’s failure to engender “signifi cant redistribution 
or substantive equality”; 4) the “impact” of successful equality movements on groups 
“left  behind or further disadvantaged”; and 5) egalitarian law reform’s sometimes-
regrettable eff ects on its “intended benefi ciaries” (3–4). Th is list is not (and does 
not purport to be) exhaustive. For one thing, it focuses exclusively on the crueler 
side of equality’s double edge. 
 Th at formal equality can have perverse consequences will not be news to readers 
acquainted with civil rights history or with a number of critical traditions in legal 
and political theory. Yet  Aft er Legal Equality refl ects a justifi ably “urgent sense that 
law reforms driven by equality call for fresh lines of inquiry” (i). Th e anthology is, 
fi rst and foremost, an extended meditation on the aft ermath of two momentous 
developments in certain countries’ regulation of sex, family, and kinship: the con-
solidation of gender-neutral norms governing parenting and cohabitation, and legal 
recognition of same-sex conjugal relationships. Insofar as the latter is, as Leckey puts 
it, the volume’s “prevalent site of investigation” (3), the collection constitutes an early 
and important instance of academic reckoning with life “aft er” gay marriage.  1  
 Several contributors to  Aft er Legal Equality do an admirable job of illuminat-
ing the post-equality phenomena enumerated in Leckey’s introduction. Egalitarian 
law reform’s potentially onerous “impact [on] those left  behind or further disad-
vantaged” (3) is neatly suggested by Rosie Harding’s account of gay marriage advo-
cates’ exclusionary insistence on the dyadic and permanent nature of marital love. 
Th e distinction between formal and substantive equality is likewise illustrated in 
Susan Boyd’s analysis of how British Columbia’s  Family Law Act does and does not 
mitigate the “uncomfortabl[e]” fi t between sex-neutral rules and “familial realities 
that remain stubbornly gendered” (42). (That distinction also underlies Janet 
Jackobsen’s intriguing essay on “economic justice aft er legal equality” (77), which 
eff ectively proposes to “queer” the welfare state by making it more responsive to, 
and supportive of, a range of care networks well beyond the nuclear family.) 
“Dismantlement” and “backlash” (3), by contrast, appear only in passing, as when 
Roderick Ferguson alludes to the US Supreme Court’s nearly simultaneous invali-
dations of key provisions of the Defense of Marriage and Voting Rights Acts. 
This coincidence, which suggests to Ferguson homosexuality’s “mainstreaming … 
via the marginalization of anti-racist protections” (159), lends urgency to his 
 1  See also  Aft er Marriage: Th e Future of LGBT Rights , ed. Carlos A. Ball (New York: NYU Press, 2016); 
 From Civil Partnership to Same-Sex Marriage: Interdisciplinary Refl ections , ed. Nicola Barker and 
Daniel Monk (London: Routledge, 2015). 
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otherwise familiar argument that contemporary lesbian, gay, bisexual and trans-
gender (LGBT) advocacy obscures the radical and often-shared aspirations of 
earlier movements for sexual and racial justice. 
 Context rather than content accounts for the novelty of several other contribu-
tions to  After Legal Equality . Jonathan Herring, for instance, puts an avowedly 
“mainstream” cast on Martha Fineman’s influential proposal that bonds of care 
and dependence rather than sexual ties should underlie legal recognition of family 
relationships (25). Claire Young’s chapter reaffi  rms her own longstanding—and 
powerful—objections to tax rules that encourage gendered divisions of marital 
labor. Th e message in both cases seems to be that, new or not, these are ideas whose 
time has come. Catherine Donovan’s chapter is explicit in this regard. Reminding 
us of the ill fit between gender-based theories of domestic violence and many 
queer relationships, Donovan argues that, having secured equality for British 
same-sex couples in terms of public recognition, “it is to equality in the intimate 
sphere that our attention [now] should be turned” (168). 
 Thus a number of contributions to  After Legal Equality draw our attention 
back to problems that, unsurprisingly, legal equality has failed to solve. Th is is not 
the same thing as describing law reform’s inadvertent consequences for “intended 
benefi ciaries” (as Leckey’s introduction would have it) (4), but it is important work 
nonetheless. Indeed, calls to resume or reinvigorate neglected or stagnant political 
projects may constitute some of the most salient and ultimately liberating modes 
of “research ‘aft er legal equality.’” Witness Rose Harding’s deft  use of two English 
cases, both involving lesbian couples and known sperm donors, to show that the 
advent of gay marriage has hardly eradicated heterosexist conceptions of legal par-
enthood. Or take Daniel Monk’s superb piece on “sexuality and children post-
equality,” which off ers a non-monogamous same-sex couple’s stalled adoption bid 
as evidence of the diff erence between ending discrimination based on sexual ori-
entation and ending discrimination based on queer sexuality. 
 Two of  Aft er Legal Equality ’s most compelling entries relate to the continued 
 in equality of married and unmarried couples. As Kim Brooks notes, both groups 
may be treated as “spouses” under Canada’s  Income Tax Act , but only the latter 
must be able to prove that the material conditions of their lives entitle them to such 
treatment. Using facts gleaned from cases of contested spousal status, Brooks pres-
ents a fascinating set of “cameos from the margins of conjugality” (99). Meanwhile 
Helen Reece cleverly analyzes an unsuccessful British campaign to promote cohabi-
tation agreements and disabuse citizens of the widespread misimpression that mar-
ried and unmarried cohabitants are treated comparably when their relationships 
end. Neither chapter quite describes a phenomenon named in Leckey’s ambitious 
agenda for post-equality studies. Yet, like most other contributions to  Aft er Legal 
Equality , both raise issues that merit some portion of the intellectual energy and 
activist eff ort so long consumed by the fi ght for gay marriage. 
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